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ABSTRACT
While interest groups are often seen as transmission belts of public preferences,
little is known as to how they might transmit such preferences. This paper
argues that the provision of information is one mechanism through which
advocates represent their constituents’ interests and analyses who informs
policymakers about these preferences and when actors are more likely to do
so. The study relies on a new dataset containing information on the
arguments advocates made in public hearings that were held on 34 specific
policy issues in Germany. The results reveal that the amount of information
on public preferences an actor provides is determined by actor type, its public
support and position on the issue. Interestingly, information on public
preferences is predominantly used by status-quo defenders. This paper
contributes to our understanding of interest groups as transmission belts and
their potential to enhance governments’ ability to respond to public
preferences.
KEYWORDS Information; interest groups; public opinion; representation; transmission belt
Interest groups are expected to act on behalf of their constituents and seen as
channels through which legitimate policy is produced (Dür and De Bièvre
2007; Gilens and Page 2014; Kohler-Koch 2009, 2010; Truman 1951; Urbinati
and Warren 2008). However, fears of interest groups bias and unequal rep-
resentation evoke the question whether interest groups are able to transmit
public preferences or whether they thwart policies away from what the
public wants (Gray et al. 2004; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and
Tierney 1986). This paper contributes to this debate by assessing the extent
to which interest groups represent citizens through the provision of infor-
mation about their preferences. Research shows that interest groups serve
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as important mediators by responding to issue priorities of citizens (Klüver
2015; Rasmussen et al. 2014) and by affecting the extent to which a govern-
ment addresses public concerns (Bevan and Rasmussen 2017; Klüver and
Pickup 2019). Scholars often assume groups work as such ‘transmission
belts’ (Lowery et al. 2015; Rasmussen et al. 2014), but only few have looked
at the extent to which interest groups reflect what the public wants (see for
example Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018; Klüver 2015; Rasmussen et al. 2014).
So far, little attention has been paid to explaining how the transmission
belt mechanism works (but see Albareda 2018). While some suggest that
interest groups work as a mediator by informing policymakers about public
preferences (Albareda 2018; Bevan and Rasmussen 2017; Eising and Spohr
2017; Klüver and Pickup 2019; Rasmussen and Reher 2019), existing research
has not included information as a variable when assessing whether groups
represent citizens.
Arguing that interest groups (or advocates) act as transmission belts by
transmitting information on public preferences to the policymaking level,
the paper analyses who informs policymakers about public preferences and
under which conditions actors are more likely to do so. Information on
public preferences is defined as information on general public opinion on
an issue and on preferences of a specific constituency. Importantly, this is
not restricted to interest group member preferences but refers to a broader
constituency that will allegedly benefit from the lobbying efforts of a group.
The paper theorises that information transmission is dependent on the
actor type and the actor’s positional alignment with the government and
the public. Empirically, the paper relies on arguments interest groups make
in written statements that are submitted in public hearings on 34 specific
policy issues in Germany. Thus, rather than relying on self-reported infor-
mation transmission of broadly defined information categories through
surveys or interviews, this unique setting allows gauging fine-grained argu-
ments to uncover some of the underlying dynamics of information provision.
The results show that, overall, interest groups provide information on
public preferences. However, citizen groups do so more frequently than pro-
fessional groups, business groups and experts, suggesting that they have a
greater potential to act as transmission belts. Moreover, predominantly
opponents of policy change transmit public preferences in order to protect
these interests if they are at risk. Furthermore, actors who share the same
opinion as a large part of the public inform policymakers more about these
preferences. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it conceptualises
interest groups as transmission belts and provides an empirical test of the
assumption that interest groups inform policymakers about what the public
wants which is a necessary condition for them to act as transmission belts.
Second, it highlights conditions under which actors are more likely to do so
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which contributes to our understanding of when interest groups have the
potential to help governments to respond to public preferences.
Interest groups as transmission belts
Interest groups are often seen as channels ‘through which citizens can express
their opinions’ to policymakers (Dür and De Bièvre 2007: 1) and portrayed as
transmission belts who aggregate and transmit public preferences (Albareda
2018; Kohler-Koch 2010; Truman 1951). While scholars often assume that
groups act as transmission belts by providing information about public prefer-
ences (Bevan and Rasmussen 2017; Eising and Spohr 2017; Klüver and Pickup
2019; Rasmussen and Reher 2019), they do not empirically consider the extent
to which groups actually engage in informational lobbying. Moreover, while
interest groups, in the aggregate, are often expected to represent diverse
and balanced interests, most individual groups primarily serve a certain con-
stituency. If we assume that groups work as transmission belts by providing
information, we should not only consider general political information but
also more fine-grained constituency-specific information. This means that
groups can work as transmission belts in a narrow and a wide sense and
provide information respectively: Wide, because some groups represent a
broad constituency and therefore provide information about general public
preferences, and narrow, because some groups focus on the interests of
their specific constituency and transmit information about their preferences.
Narrow does not necessarily mean information about members of a group,
yet refers to certain subparts of society such as ‘families’ or ‘the poor’.
The literature on informational lobbying has referred to such information
as political information, which includes information regarding support or
opposition of a specific constituency or the public at large (see for example
De Bruycker 2016; Nownes and Newmark 2016). Importantly, however,
Nownes finds that advocates do not necessarily make arguments about the
public as whole, but rather about certain parts of society (2006: 66). To
allow for a systematic analysis of how interest groups can act as transmission
belts, the paper defines such information as information on public prefer-
ences, which refers both to information on preferences of the public at
large but also preferences of specific constituencies and certain segments
of the society (cf. Burstein 2014).
In order to understand how groups act as transmission belts the paper
follows Saward who defines representation as a dynamic process in which
multiple actors articulate representative claims to an audience to ‘represent
or to know what represents the interests of someone or something’ (2006:
305). Saward criticises Pitkin (1967), who acknowledges that representative
institutions provide information about the people, but takes such information
as given and neglects the process of providing such information. Saward shifts
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the focus to the act of making present and the actor making such claims. Even
though Saward’s conceptualisation is not without problems either, the focus
on claims allows for analysing representation through non-elected represen-
tatives such as interest groups (for a discussion, see De Wilde 2013). A repre-
sentative claim can be expressed in a number of ways but may refer for
example to the needs/desires/preferences of a person or a group of people.
Representation through interest groups, then, can be thought of as an act
where advocates mobilise on a specific issue (e.g., reforming child support)
to actively promote a position (e.g., no cuts) in the interest of a group of
people (e.g., families with children) by informing policymakers about the inter-
ests of the group of people (cf. Severs 2012). So for representation to occur
and for a group to act as a transmission belt, advocates may either signal
support or opposition of the public at large or, importantly, of specific consti-
tuencies. Such a conceptualisation considers the two underlying mechanisms
of how the transmission belt works. A first assumption therefore is:
H0: Interest groups use information about public preferences when lobbying
policymakers.
While this does not allow for drawing inferences about whether interest
groups are effective in transmitting preferences, it sheds light on a necessary
(but insufficient) condition for acting as a transmission belt, i.e., whether (and
under which conditions) they provide such information in the first place.
Given the focus on the actors of ‘making present’, the paper theorises how
variation in the actor’s characteristics affects information provision.
Who informs about public preferences?
Although scholars have not found differences across actor types with regard
to information provision (De Bruycker 2016; Nownes and Newmark 2016),
there are several hints in the literature why we could expect groups to
differ in their motivations for transmitting information about public
preferences.
First, information provision is determined by the type of constituency.
While some groups have a clearly defined constituency, others represent a
broad public interest (Olson 1965). For example, some groups aim at promot-
ing broader interests (improved air quality) which are not tied to a specific
constituency (such as doctors) or restricted to benefit members only (Binderk-
rantz et al. 2015). Instead, the benefits are collectively available. Public interest
groups typically defend diffuse public interests that are not exclusive to their
members but the public at large (Dür and Mateo 2013). Even identity groups
(e.g., patient groups), who have a slightly more specific constituency promote
interests that also non-members could benefit from. Since these groups often
rely on (potential) members and supporters for organisational survival, they
4 L. FLÖTHE
are under greater pressure to demonstrate that they act in the interest of their
constituency (Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018; Klüver 2015: 141), which may also
increase the transmission of information about their preferences. Business
groups and firms, in contrast, have clearly defined constituencies. Such
groups typically aim at delivering exclusive services for their constituency
and defend interests that mainly their members could benefit from. The
primary goal of such organisations is service-provision and lobbying is a by-
product (Olson 1965). Their focus may hence be less on informing policy-
makers about what their constituents want but more on technical details
that help improve regulations to their advantage (Klüver 2011: 4). Lastly, pro-
fessional groups such as trade unions and occupational groups also represent
a narrower constituency than citizen groups. Even if they may be more
responsive to their members than business groups, their main motivation is
to primarily provide services that mainly their members would benefit from.
Secondly, groups have different capacities and exchange goods to offer
when lobbying policymakers (Bouwen 2002; Daugbjerg et al. 2018; Dür and
Mateo 2013). Policymakers need technical expertise to increase their output
legitimacy, but also information about political support to increase their
input legitimacy (Bouwen 2002; Wright 1996). While information about
general public opinion may be quite accessible for policymakers, issue-
specific information about preferences of different sub-groups is more
difficult to access. Policymakers may have preferred options for sources for
the different types of information. Citizen groups, since they represent
broad interests, are assumed to articulate a diversity of interests and are there-
fore able to contribute to the input legitimacy of the policymaking process
(Kohler-Koch 2010: 106). Moreover, they should validate that their claims
reflect the concerns of their constituents (Kohler-Koch 2009: 54) and invest
in ‘determining member preferences’ (Schlozman and Tierney 1986: 142),
which makes them a credible source of such information and can help to legit-
imise a policy decision (Michalowitz 2004: 85). Actors without mass member-
ship such as expert organisations but also firms cannot credibly provide this
information to the same extent (cf. Wright 1996: 92). In contrast, business
groups, professional groups and also experts are a credible source of expert
information (Bouwen 2002) as they are close to the market (Dür and Mateo
2013; Eising 2007), have hands-on experience (Dür and Mateo 2013; Michalo-
witz 2004), better capacities to understand the technical and scientific context
or even such data themselves (Yackee and Yackee 2006). Given that each
information type requires different resources, one can expect groups to
specialise in their core capacities (cf. Daugbjerg et al. 2018) and those
resources they are especially approached for. This does not imply that
business groups or professional groups do not provide information about
their members, yet given that access to expert information is easier for
them (Dür and Mateo 2013) one could expect them to emphasise this type
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of information more. Similarly, citizen groups might focus on their core
capacity, i.e., provide input legitimacy by transmitting information about
public preferences. In sum, interest groups differ in the type of interest they
represent and the type of resources they possess. Whereas some place
higher emphasis on pursuing interests for a collective good, others are
more focused on sharing their expertise or lobby for specific interests. This
does not rule out that all actor types transmit information on public prefer-
ences but their propensity to do so should vary.
H1: Citizen groups are likely to provide more information on public preferences
than professional groups, business groups and expert groups.
Under which conditions do actors inform about public preferences?
Interest groups may not necessarily transmit information on public prefer-
ences with the intention to represent the public’s interest, but to strategically
justify their position and pressure policymakers (De Bruycker 2016; Wright
1996). Research on informational lobbying shows that actors lobby differently
depending on their position on a policy (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Burstein
2014). Burstein shows that opponents of policy change use arguments that
cast doubts regarding the proposed solution and its effectiveness (2014:
148), suggesting that opponents use information negatively to warn for unde-
sired consequences. This suggests that advocates channel their constituents’
interests especially when their interest is at risk. Kingdon noted that the public
sometimes directs governments to do something, yet most of the time con-
strains the government from doing something (1984). Policymakers rely on
interest groups for information to reduce some of the uncertainties they
face when deciding on a policy (Wright 1996) and opponents of policy
change can use information to highlight the risks of change, something pol-
icymakers fear. Hence, opponents of policy change use information on public
preferences more frequently to signal negative consequences for (parts of)
the public. They may transmit such information to warn of negative conse-
quences to strategically increase fears and uncertainties or to protect their
constituents for undesired policy change.
H2: Opponents of policy change transmit information on public preferences
more frequently than supporters.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the amount of support an actor enjoys
from other players (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Nownes and Newmark 2016).
Given the paper’s focus on the transmission belt mechanism, an actor’s align-
ment with the public is considered. Public backing is a powerful resource for
interest groups to signal broad support and representational value. A recent
study shows that certain types of advocates are more successful when they
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have public opinion on their side (Rasmussen et al. 2018) as a large public
majority is difficult for the government to ignore. Knowing how important
public support is, interest groups cannot ignore it (Nownes 2006: 101) and
may even be tempted to use information about public preferences strategi-
cally (Wright 1996). The more people the actor has on its side, the higher
the representational value of an actor’s claim as a large part of the public
may benefit from or support the new policy. It does not mean that actors
who represent minority preferences do not transmit their constituents’ inter-
est when they only have low support for their claim. However, the represen-
tational value would be rather low and the electoral consequences for
policymakers may be minor. In such a scenario, the emphasis on this infor-
mation should be limited at best. Likewise the likelihood of transmitting
more of the information should increase if the actor enjoys broad public
support as it demonstrates broad acceptance for the claim.
H3: An actor with a higher proportion of the public on its side is likely to transmit
more information on public preferences than an actor with lower support.
Research design
The study relies on observed information transmission in public hearings held
by standing committees of the German parliament. The hearings are sup-
posed to generate issue-specific expertise and information on actors’ position
and general support on the topic (Burstein 2014: 130; Eising and Spohr 2017:
316). Public hearings in Germany take place after a bill proposal has been
assigned to a committee. The proposals have been initiated by the govern-
ment and opposition parties. Eventually, 59% of the issues in the sample
were enacted. One could argue that predominantly advocates are invited to
hearings who support a policy proposal to help policymakers legitimise a
policy decision.1 Yet, we see that only 36% of the advocates were in favour
of policy change. This indicates a higher mobilisation of actors who want to
protect the status-quo and speaks to a common pattern found in the literature
(cf. Baumgartner et al. 2009). As a working parliament, the German Parliament
consists of highly professionalised parliamentarians who are able to exert a
considerable degree of influence which makes the committees and their hear-
ings an important venue for advocates (Eising and Spohr 2017: 318–9) and
hearings an interesting case to uncover underlying mechanisms of infor-
mation provision. Analysing written statements by interest groups is a novel
way of studying information provision. Most studies rely on self-reported
information transmission through surveys or interviews (for an exception
see Burstein 2014). This is likely to uncover only the information types that
actors find most important and may overlook types that are less consciously
used. Focussing on one venue in a single country allows labour-intensive
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coding of arguments to get a more accurate picture of information provision
(cf. Burstein 2014: 130–59).
Issue sampling and data collection
The sample of issues is based on a dataset developed within the larger GovLis2
project that contains 102 specific policy proposals in Germany. The starting
points of data collection are existing nationally representative public
opinion polls on specific policy issues that were held between 1998 and
2010. Selected issues had to fall under national jurisdiction (as opposed to
the EU or sub-national level) and the opinion poll questions had to ask for
a change of the status quo. Issues in the sample concern, for example, the
question of raising the tobacco tax (see Online Appendix A for a list of
issues). Polls are likely to be conducted on relatively salient policy issues
and a sample based on them does not constitute a completely random
sample of policy issues (Burstein 2014). However, citizens should have at
least somewhat informed opinions if interest groups are expected to transmit
them meaningfully (Gilens 2012: 50–6). Following Gilens (2012), the obser-
vation period for each policy issue starts in the year the policy item was
asked by the pollster and ends four years later or when policy changed.
This study relies on a subsample of issues on which public hearings were
held during the observation period and focuses on written evidence. The
final sample contains 34 issues on which 42 hearings were held in which
actors made 356 statements about the issue. The unit of analysis is an actor
in a hearing. Each actor is counted once for testifying at a hearing on the
specific issue, however appearances at different hearings on the same issue
are counted separately (Burstein 2014: 141; Eising and Spohr 2017). An
issue can be discussed in multiple hearings and a hearing can discuss multiple
issues, which suggests a cross-classified multilevel structure with actors
nested in hearings and issues. However, given that variance at the hearing
level is quite low and the data structure overly complex, information provision
will be modelled in a two-level structure with actors nested in policy issues.
Model fit does not significantly differ irrespective of whether actors are
nested within hearings or issues or within each other.
Dependent variable
Information types in this paper are conceptualised as arguments with which
advocates underpin their position. Arguments are stated reasons an actor
uses to justify and substantiate its position (Eising et al. 2017: 5). Thus, after
identifying an actor’s position on an issue, the different types of arguments
used to defend the position were coded by two trained coders. Online Appen-
dix C1 contains the coding instructions including examples. Arguments are
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counted separately if a different argument is provided in the next paragraph
or if the causal story for why the actor supports (opposes) policy change
differs. Two coders independently coded 50 units, which resulted in an accep-
table Krippendorff’s alpha of .72 (De Wever et al. 2007).
The dependent variable Information on Public Preferences relies on two
proxies which capture the underlying mechanisms of the transmission belt.
The first proxy counts how often an actor makes any references about how
much public support (opposition) a policy proposal has. The second proxy
records how often the actor argues how a policy proposal will affect certain
segments of society. This partially follows Burstein’s operationalisation of pol-
itical information, which includes not only references to broad public support
but also how advocates refer to how a policy will affect certain subparts they
(claim to) represent. An example would be ‘We oppose the proposal because
it will aggravate the situation of the poor’. This measurement allows gauging
the observed transmission of more specific information that interest groups
provide about constituency preferences (as opposed to general public
opinion polls that policymakers can also access via other channels). The
count measure moreover captures the extent to which actors reinforce
certain arguments. The dependent variable combines these two count
measures and ranges from 0 to 11 (see Online Appendix B1 for an overview
of all variables).
Independent variables
The independent variable Actor Type distinguishes between four types which
are derived from a broader coding scheme for interest groups developed by
the INTERARENA project (Binderkrantz et al. 2015) with the addition of firms
and experts (see Online Appendix C2). The category ‘citizen groups’ includes
public interest groups and identity & hobby groups such as environmental
groups or patients groups. This category includes groups that have a strong
incentive to represent their members or a more diffuse interest. The category
‘business groups’ includes firms and business associations, which have a
strong advantage over policy expertise and which aim to protect exclusive
interests. Professional groups include trade unions and occupational
groups. A last category refers to experts, institutional associations and think
tanks that are assumed to provide expertise without taking a side for a pre-
ferred constituency. The second independent variable Pro Change captures
an actor’s position on an issue, which can be in favour or against policy
change. This binary measure is based on a self-reported statement in a
written submission to the hearing. Krippendorff’s alpha reports an acceptable
score of .86 for this variable. Lastly, Public Support is measured as the pro-
portion of the public in the opinion poll on the issue that shares the same pos-
ition as an actor on the issue (based on the coded position in the hearing).
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Control variables
One variable controls for the overall number of arguments an actor has made
because the likelihood of providing information on public preferences may be
higher if the actor provides more arguments in general. Another variable con-
trols for policy type, distinguishing between regulatory, redistributive and dis-
tributive policy issues (Lowi 1964). Information on public preferences may be
more likely on redistributive issues where actors discuss the allocation of
resources, whereas the discussion on regulatory issues is expected to be
more technical. Media saliency controls for whether higher public awareness
increases references to public preferences. Saliency is measured by the log of
the average number of newspaper articles on the issue per day in two major
German newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche
Zeitung) during the observation period. Lastly, a variable controls for
whether an actor provided technical information to rule out that differences
between group types are driven by the fact that citizen groups compensate
potentially lacking technical information with the provision of information
on public preferences. Technical information refers to the provision of scien-
tific evidence, facts and detailed technical knowledge. Krippendorff’s alpha for
this binary variable is 0.87. The analysis applies multilevel negative binomial
models with random intercepts for policy issues to account for the heterogen-
eity of different issues and for over-dispersion of the count measure.3
Analysis
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on information provision by different
types of actors. As the right column shows, information on public preferences
is used by 45% of the actors. The figures in the left columns indicate that
citizen groups are more likely to inform policymakers about public prefer-
ences: While 64% provide this information, approximately 44% of professional
groups and business groups and 30% of experts supply this type of infor-
mation. Ultimately, however, the figures show that groups do transmit infor-
mation about public preferences and have hence the potential to act as
transmission belts.
Table 2 presents the findings to test hypotheses 1–3. As predicted in
hypothesis 1, the negative coefficients in Models 1 and 2 (adding control












64.29 43.90 44.00 30.00 45.22
Total N 84 82 100 90 356
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variables) indicate that professional groups, business groups and experts
provide significantly less information on public preferences than citizen
groups. Model 2 shows that the differences for professional groups and
business groups are significant at p < 0.05 and for experts at p < 0.001. Mar-
ginal predicted mean counts for different types of actors (based on Model
2) reveal that on average citizen groups provide information on public prefer-
ences 1.3 times per statement, while the amount for the other types of actors
is between 0.66 and 0.86.
However, the differences for the amount of information become only sig-
nificant after controlling for the overall number of arguments made. While it is
crucial to control for the length of an actor’s contribution, it suggests that
groups differ significantly regarding the emphasis they put on information
about public preferences. Online Appendix D provides an alternative analysis
using a binary outcome variable, i.e., whether or not an actor provided
Table 2. Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression with random intercepts for policy
issues (SEs in parentheses).
Model 1 2












































Policy issue intercept Yes Yes
N cases (issues) 356 (34) 356 (34)
AIC 756 751
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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information on public preferences. Overall, the results are similar and the
differences are significant even when not controlling for the length of an
actor’s contribution (not shown). Hence, interest group type is an important
predictor for whether the actor provides information on public preferences
in the first place. If actors decide to transmit such information, they differ sig-
nificantly regarding how much they emphasise such information. A further
exploration of the control variable technical information supports this
finding. As Model 2 shows, actors that provide technical information are
less likely to provide information on public preferences. When not controlling
for number of arguments the effect of technical information is positive and
significant at p < 0.05 (not shown). This suggest that, generally, the higher
the likelihood that an actor provides technical information the higher the like-
lihood that the actor provides information on public preferences. Yet, when
considering the length of the contribution, the results indicate that the
emphasis is really one-sided: The more technical information provided, the
less information on public preferences is provided.
Hence, when trying to explain information provision, it is crucial to also
look at the other types of information that are provided as this ultimately
affects the provision of a specific type. This could also explain why some
other work has not found differences across group types as the relational
aspect has not been considered or is difficult to capture with self-reported
information provision, whereby actors can make less accurate estimations
of howmuch a certain type of information was used or was considered impor-
tant (De Bruycker 2016). It does not mean that business and professional
groups do not provide information about public preferences, nor that their
informational value is less, solely that citizen groups emphasise it more, poss-
ibly because it is their stock in trade as they are a legitimate source for such
information.
Second, it was predicted that an actor’s position on the issue affects the
provision of information on public preferences (H2). As shown in Model 2,
opponents of policy change differ significantly from supporters in the
amount of information on public preferences they provide. The negative
coefficient indicates that supporters of policy change provide less information
(p < 0.001). Hence, opponents of policy change transmit more information on
public preferences, possibly in order to warn of negative consequences for
their constituents and to either protect their interests or to use it strategically
to pressure policymakers. Information is used as a warning signal or as a threat
to raise levels of uncertainty about proposed policy changes (Baumgartner
et al., 2009: 131) which may be especially effective given the risk aversion
of policymakers. This suggests that if the public interest is at risk (at least
according to the advocates), policymakers get informed about that. It also
adds to our knowledge of how advocates lobby differently, depending on
their position on an issue. In fact, it may be one mechanism driving the
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status-quo bias in the first place. One could argue that the result is driven by
the fact that most issues receive very little attention and therefore rivalry
amongst actors (Baumgartner and Leech 2001) and that mobilisation is
often one-sided, with predominantly opponents of policy change mobilising
at higher rates in order to protect existing legislations (Baumgartner et al.
2009). Online Appendix E therefore provides an analysis controlling for the
level of conflict amongst advocates on an issue. While the results show that
actors provide less information about public preferences when they face
less conflict, the control does not alter the results.
Lastly, it was argued that the amount of public support an actor enjoys
affects information provision. In line with this hypothesis, Model 2 shows a
positive and significant relationship between public support and the
amount of information the actor provides (p < 0.01). Thus, the higher the
share amongst the public having the same view as an actor, the more infor-
mation on public preferences are transmitted by that actor. Figure 1 shows
the predicted mean counts of information on public preferences for
different levels of public support with 95% confidence intervals (based on
Model 2).
When interacting public support with group type (Online Appendix F), the
results show that citizen groups, professional groups and business groups all
provide more information on public preferences when they have higher
Figure 1. Predicted counts for public support for an actor.
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public support, while the information provision of experts slightly decreases.
The differences are, however, not significant. Hence, most groups transmit
more information on public preferences when they promote the same view,
meaning the more public support actors have, the more they actually push
for it. This may underline the strategic usage of this type of information and
adds to studies that have shown that interest groups are more successful
when they have the public on their side (Rasmussen et al. 2018).
All findings are robust to controlling for a number of factors. As expected,
actors provide more information about public preferences on redistributive
issues compared to regulatory ones (p < 0.05), possibly because the conflic-
tual nature of such issues incentivises advocates to transmit their constituents’
interest. Furthermore, there is a highly significant effect (p < 0.001) for the
overall number of arguments made by an actor, i.e., the more arguments
an actor makes the more information on public preferences is provided.
Alternative model specifications and limitations
As mentioned, Online Appendix D provides an analysis using a binary
measure indicating whether an actor transmitted public preferences or not.
While the results for public support are not significant, all other findings
show the same results. It suggests that public support is more important for
the amount of information and less for whether to provide the information
at all. This also fits to the caveat mentioned earlier: Minority groups are not
less likely to provide information about their constituents when they have
no public support, yet advocates provide it more frequently, the more their
claim is supported by the general public.
Furthermore, the argument has been that interest groups act as trans-
mission belts by informing both about general public opinion as well as
specific constituents’ interest. Interestingly, advocates primarily make refer-
ences to specific constituents and not public opinion at large. This shows
that interest groups use public hearings to provide quite specific, probably
privately held, information about their constituents that policymaker cannot
easily access by other means such as the media or party colleagues.
Online Appendix G therefore presents the main analysis using one proxy
only and shows that the results are even stronger when looking at information
on preferences of specific segments of society only.
The present study uses a unique dataset to empirically test a new theoreti-
cal argument, but the design comes with some limitations. First, it is important
to bear in mind that the issues in the sample may be somewhat more salient
than the average policy issue given that they were sampled from opinion polls
and discussed in public hearings, which may have increased public attention
and actor mobilisation. A fair share of them concern tax or welfare issues,
which often stimulate larger public interest than other types of issues.
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Taken together, this could mean that information about public preferences
was easier to access for advocates on the policy issues in the sample. Further-
more, it could imply that the level of conflict on these issues is higher than
average due to higher mobilisation. Yet, it also suggests that on issues the
public cares about, interest groups take on their concerns and transmit
their preferences.
Second, while the measure of information about public preferences
allowed for gauging both references to public and constituency specific
opinion, it only considers such references if the actor specifically referred to
the public or a specific group of people. Obviously, groups can represent
the public’s interest also by providing technical information. Even though
this would not be counted as representation in Saward’s sense, it does not
mean that such actors do not act in the interest of a constituency. This
could imply that also business groups and professional groups transmit
more constituency preferences than this study might lead us to expect. Yet,
the same could be said for citizen groups, that is, the measure used in this
study might also miss more of their attempts to act as representatives by pro-
viding technical expertise. In fact, we do not see significant differences
amongst citizen groups and business and professional groups when looking
at the amount of technical information (not shown) they provide, which sup-
ports existing research (De Bruycker 2016; Nownes and Newmark 2016) and
suggests that citizen groups make use of it to a similar extent.
Conclusion
It has been argued that interest groups act as transmission belts and may be
able to enhance a government’s ability to respond to citizens by informing
policymakers about public preferences. However, studies that have conceived
of interest groups as transmission belts have not examined how this mechan-
ism works – both theoretically and empirically. To address this, the paper
defined representation as ‘claims-making’ and conceptualised the trans-
mission belt mechanism as the transmission of information about public pre-
ferences. This allowed conducting a systematic analysis of the information
provided by interest groups; examining both how frequently it is used and
the conditions under which it is supplied. It put forward expectations regard-
ing how actor type, an actor’s position on an issue and an actor’s public
support affect information provision. These predictions were tested on a
new dataset that pools information on the extent to which interest groups
provide information on public preferences in public hearings. In addition to
expanding on the limited body of knowledge on information transmission
of public preferences, the study’s content coding of observed information
provides a more detailed measure of information transmission than existing
studies that rely on surveys and interviews.
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The results show that citizen groups transmit more information on public
preferences than professional groups, business groups and experts. Thus,
those that are seen as important surrogates of the public do transmit these
preferences and have the potential to act as information providers that
help public preferences get transmitted to policymakers. A recent study
shows that groups vary somewhat in the extent to which they share the
same view as the majority of the public (Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018). It is
the same type of actors that is more likely to share the same view as the
public that is also more likely to transmit information on public preferences
to the policymaking level, suggesting that citizen groups are better able to
represent the public both in substantive terms as well as in the sense of repre-
sentative claims. Yet also those for whom representation is a by-product and
who are often accused of dominating the interest group landscape transmit
preferences. Interestingly, professional groups do not differ from business
groups in their provision of information on public preferences. Furthermore,
opponents of policy change provide more information on public preferences
than supporters. Hence, if interest groups perceive the public interest is at risk,
they inform policymakers about these negative consequences, which could
be a potential mechanism driving the status quo bias as policymakers may
be especially keen to avoid such risks. Lastly, the study shows that the
more people share the same view as an actor, the more information on
these preferences is provided. This underlines the potential of groups to act
according to the wishes of the public and pushing for these preferences. Ulti-
mately, this paper helps to understand why, when and how interest groups
provide policymakers with information on public preferences, which is a
necessary condition for groups to act as transmission belts. The paper does
not evaluate whether representation through interest groups is successful,
i.e., it does not look at whether policymakers respond to the signalled prefer-
ences (Kohler-Koch 2010). Future research could explore the extent to which
groups are effective in transmitting public preferences. This paper, however,
links interest representation to public preferences to assess the extent to
which interest groups can act as representatives of the public to explore
the complex relationship between public opinion, interest groups and
public policy.
Notes
1. Also submissions of uninvited actors have been coded. However, they only
account for a small share (4%) and controlling for it does not change the
results (not shown).
2. www.govlis.eu
3. Alternatively, a zero inflated model could be used as the number of actors not
providing political information is relatively high. However, there are no theoreti-
cal reasons to expect structural differences in whether actors provide this
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information at all and how frequent they do so and using such a model without
theoretical reasons would risk overfitting the data (Allison 2012; Long and Freese
2001: 262). Furthermore, since zero inflated models cannot easily be run with
random effects, multi-level negative binomial models were applied instead.
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